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COMMENTS
THE NIGHT BEFORE BANKRUPTCY: THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE TO BANKRUPTCY
ESTATE PLANNING
[Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) and
Panuska v. Johnson (In reJohnson), 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1987)]
INTRODUCTION

'Twas the night before bankruptcy and all through the house, not a debtor was
earning, not even a spouse. Exemptions were picked by attorneys with care, in
hopes that debt discharge soon would be there. The creditors lay sleeping all
snug in their beds, while fraudulent transfers danced in their heads. Being
empty of head, but pure in my heart, I hadjust settled down to enjoy my 'fresh
start."
Wanting to preserve as much of one's property in spite of bankruptcy is a natural human desire1-the instinct for self-preservation.
The conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets is thus an
understandable temptation for any debtor contemplating bankruptcy. Temptation or not, the appropriateness and legality of such
conversions presents a perplexing and unresolved question: Is it lawful bankruptcy estate planning 2 or an unlawful effort to thwart creditors? As one might expect, the answer ultimately depends on who is
asked and on which side of the issue they stand. On one side, creditors argue that such conversions are a depletion of assets available
for distribution to creditors. On the other side, debtors maintain
that it is merely an exercise of the debtor's rights under existing
bankruptcy law. Within the penumbra of uncertainty that surrounds
1. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 1.0 1-.14 (1980 &

Supp. 1988).
2. For purposes of this Comment, the term "bankruptcy estate planning," refers to conduct by debtors undertaken to increase the amount of assets retained by
the debtor and to reduce the extent of his liabilities after bankruptcy. This includes
the conversion of nonexempt, unsecured assets into exempt assets within one year
prior to the filing of bankruptcy. Transfers occurring more than one year before
filing bankruptcy are scrutinized under a common law fraud analysis. The term
"bankruptcy estate planning" is to be distinguished from the general term "prebankruptcy planning" which, though including those aspects, incorporates other conduct
such as a debtor's attempts to maintain relationships and favor certain creditors. See

Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PaoBs. No. 2, 89, 100-09
(1987).
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the issue, bankruptcy judges are forced to choose between two extremes. The polarity of current opinion is exemplified in the recent
cases of Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten 3 and Panuska v. Johnson.4
Tveten andJohnson are two more in a line of cases striving to distinguish between transfers that are the proper exercise of exemption
rights and transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors.5 In both cases, the property conversions were initiated as
part of each debtor's overall bankruptcy estate planning. In Tveten,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's
findings of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors in connection
with the debtor's conversion of approximately $700,000 of nonexempt assets into exempt assets. 6 This decision, however, sows uncertainty for debtors considering bankruptcy because the court failed
to articulate a clear standard as to what constitutes wrongful bankruptcy estate planning.
Similar facts, yet differing results, make Tveten andJohnson difficult
cases to reconcile. This difficulty is compounded in that both cases
arise in the same bankruptcy district, review similar debtor conduct,
and interpret the same controlling statute. In addition, the debtors
in both cases were business associates, represented by the same legal
counsel, and sought discharge of the same debts. In Johnson, the conversion of approximately $435,000 worth of nonexempt property to
exempt property was seen as mere "bankruptcy estate planning"
which did not warrant a denial of discharge.7
The issue raised in both Tveten and Johnson strikes at the very core
of bankruptcy law. To analyze this issue, the fundamental aspects of
the controversy must be considered in light of the overall aim and
purpose of bankruptcy in our society. This Comment will first examine the development and policy considerations of the discharge
and exemption provisions in bankruptcy and the judicial analysis of
bankruptcy estate planning. This Comment will then examine the
3. 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
4. 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). This decision was affirmed on appeal
to the District Court in an unreported opinion by Judge Rosenbaum. Panuska v.

Johnson (In reJohnson), 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987), aff'd, Civ. No. 4-88217 (D. Minn. Jun. 16, 1988). A subsequent appeal is currently pending before the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Oral arguments in the matter were heard on February 15, 1989 in St. Paul before Judges Fagg, Gibson, and Heaney.
5. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Ellingson (In re Ellingson), 63 Bankr.
271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re Butts, 45 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
6. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876-77. Not only was the debtor denied discharge, but
his claimed exemptions were also lost. The bankruptcy court raised a question as to
the validity of the exemptions under Minnesota law. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
in response to the questions certified by the bankruptcy court, held that the state
statute granting the claimed exemption violated the Minnesota Constitution and was
therefore invalid. See In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1987).
7. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 960-61.
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BANKRUPTCY ESTATE PLANNING

reasoning underlying the Tveten andJohnson holdings and the impact
of these two cases on bankruptcy estate planning.
I.

DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISCHARGE
AND FRESH START PROVISIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

By converting nonexempt property into exempt property, bankruptcy estate planning places the policies of discharge of debts and
exemptions of property in a struggle for supremacy. While theoretically separate and distinct, the policies advanced by these two aspects
of bankruptcy law promote related interests within the Bankruptcy
Code.

A.

Discharge of Debts in Bankruptcy

1. Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy
Discharge 8 from debts is the obvious and ultimate goal of an individual debtor under current bankruptcy law. 9 When it is granted,
discharge not only frees the debtor from personal obligations owed
to his creditors, but it permanently enjoins creditors from collecting
prebankruptcy debts or recovering from the debtor's postbankruptcy
earnings or property.10 Through discharge the debtor receives a
clean economic slate.
As common as discharge has become, it has not always been so
liberal or available. Despite biblical directives to the contrary,"
early bankruptcy laws did not discharge a debtor from the obligations owed to his creditors.' 2 Instead, there existed quasi-punitive
8. The term "discharge" has held a variety of meanings in connection with
bankruptcy law. Previously, the term has included payment of the debt, release from
liability for arrest and suit, or release from debtor's prison. In current bankruptcy
lexicon, the word "discharge" applies to the debtor's release from liability for debts.
See Ayer, infra note 13, at 367 n.40.
9. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 1, at § 1.02 n.2.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The granting of discharge has the
effect of voiding any judgment pertaining to a discharged debt, enjoining the commencement, continuation, or issue of legal process to recover or collect any such
debt as a personal liability of the debtor or against property acquired by the debtor
after the commencement of the case. Id.
11. At the end of every seven-year period you shall have a relaxation of
debts, which shall be observed as follows. Every creditor shall relax his
claim on what he has loaned his neighbor; he must not press his neighbor,
his kinsman, because a relaxation in honor of the Lord has been proclaimed.
You may press a foreigner, but you shall relax the claim on your kinsman for
what is yours.
Deuteronomy 15:1-4.
12. The early English system of bankruptcy evolved from a crude form of bankruptcy liquidation created under Roman Law as far back as 118 B.C. Under the Roman law, a debtor's estate was sold in a lump sale to a buyer who would pay the
creditors a percentage of the debt. Since a debtor was liable for his debts with his life
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measures aimed at punishing the debtor's perceived active wrongdoing in not paying his debts.'1 The modem concept of debt discharge
did not appear in statutory form until the early eighteenth century
under the reign of Queen Anne of England. 14
In the United States, discharge has been a feature of American
bankruptcy law since its inception. The first American bankruptcy
law provided for a limited discharge, but the approval of two-thirds
of the creditors was required.t5 The second Bankruptcy Act,16
adopted in 1841, departed from the previous Act and granted discharge unless the creditors objected. The economic crisis following
the Civil War produced the third Bankruptcy Act, which further liberalized the granting of discharge.' 7 From that point, it was a short
step to the absolute discharge provided in the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.18

The original purpose prompting discharge provisions was not, as
and body, no discharge was granted. See Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy, 81 CoM. L.J. 226, 226 (1976).
13. While debtor dissection and debtor slavery were not sanctioned by English
law, procedures developed whereby a creditor could have a debtor imprisoned and
held until the debt was paid. Id. (citing Statute of Acton Burnell, 11 Edw. I (1283);
Statute of Merchants, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 3 (1285)).
Enacted in 1542, the first English bankruptcy law only served to enlarge prison
populations. The law applied to those persons "craftily obtaining into their hands
great substance of other men's goods, who suddenly flee to parts unknown or keep
their houses, not minding to pay or restore to their creditors their debts and duties,
but at their own will and pleasure consume the substance obtained by credit of other
men, for their own pleasure and delicate living against all reason, equity and good
conscience." See Ayer, How to Think about Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355,
367 n.39 (1986).
14. See Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 70 n.7 (1982) (citing an Act to Prevent
Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts, 4 & 5, Anne, ch.17, § 8 (1705)). Professor Boshkoff states:
Not all debtors were eligible for bankruptcy, but for those who were, the Act
provided complete relief ... It discharged all debts existing when the proceeding was commenced and was available over the objections of creditors ....
In 1706, Parliament instituted the requirement that four-fifths of
debtors' creditors, in number and amount, must consent to the granting of
discharge.
Id. (citing An Act to Explain and Amend an Act of the Last Session of Parliament for
Preventing Frauds Frequently Committed by Bankrupts, 6 Anne, ch. 22, § 2 (1706)).
15. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 34, 36, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
16. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
17. This Act provided that a debtor paying his creditors at least fifty percent of
his debt need not obtain a favorable vote from his creditors. This percentage was
later reduced to thirty percent by an amendment added in 1874. Bankruptcy Act of
1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, amended by, Act of Jun. 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 9, 18
Stat. 178, (repealed 1878). See Countryman, supra note 12, at 229.
18. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). Under present law, the court shall grant discharge unless there is an objection. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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one might suppose, a benevolent endeavor to relieve the debtor's
economic woes.' 9 Discharge was initially offered as an inducement
to gain the debtor's cooperation in the bankruptcy proceedings.20
The debtor was considered more likely to cooperate with the proceedings if rewarded for his involvement. Today, debtor cooperation is encouraged by the explicit punishments for the debtor's
failure to assist in the proceedings. 2 1 The advent of the "fresh start"
policy, with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 189822 ushered
in a new age of bankruptcy theory.
2.

The Fresh Start Policy

The fresh start policy changed the purpose of discharge and with it
the entire focus of the bankruptcy process. 23 With the discharge
provisions at its heart,24 the fresh start policy is ladened with humanitarian 2 5 and paternalistic26 concerns independent of the creditor19. Ayer, supra note 13, at 368.
20. J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, 20-21 (1956). The
early English discharge provisions were introduced "not primarily, it would appear,
out of consideration for the debtor's hardship. Penal sanctions had not evoked satisfactory cooperation from debtors directed to surrender their estates for administration by bankruptcy courts. The discharge was promoted as a reward for debtors who
gave better cooperation." Id.; see also Ayer, supra note 13, at 368 n.45 (citing 4 Anne
ch. 17 (1705)).
21. A debtor may be denied discharge for failing to cooperate with the bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)-(6) (1982) (denial of discharge for
making false oath; false claim; withholding information or records from the trustee;
failure to explain satisfactorily any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet
debtor's liabilities; refusing to obey orders of the court).
22. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
23. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (the fresh start is supposed to give the honest but unfortunate debtor a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554-55 (1915) (to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh). In examining the legislative intent behind the
passage of the 1898 Act, it is apparent that Congress viewed the fresh start policy as
beneficial to society as a whole. Ayer, supra note 13, at 368. In passing the 1898 Act,
Congress stated:
The friends of a bankruptcy law contend that when an honest man is hopelessly down financially, nothing is gainedfor the public by keeping him down,
but, on the contrary, the public good will be promoted by having his assets
distributed ratably as far as they will go among his creditors and letting him
start anew. The recent financial crisis has crippled so many good, aggressive, useful citizens all over the country that present conditions appeal
loudly for the passage of a bankruptcy law.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 65, 55-2, Dec. 16, 1897) (emphasis added).
24. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS

5787.

25. The humanitarianism embodied by the fresh start policy is reflected by the
expression that discharge is directed toward "reliev[ing] the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit[ing] him to start afresh from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes." The case cus-
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oriented distribution rules of bankruptcy law. It appears that creditor collection efforts have taken a back seat to the debtor's financial
rehabilitation.27

The fresh start discharge enables individuals to preserve future
earnings, for future consumption, free from past debts.28 Requiring
a preservation of assets for the future serves societal as well as individual interests by fostering renewed productivity.29 The pressure of
excessive debt on one's family, emotional health, and job security
often seriously impair the debtor's productivity. In these cases a net
social gain is realized by terminating costly collection efforts, excusing debts, and allowing the debtor a fresh start.3 0 The specific scope
of that fresh start, however, remains unsettled. Whereas the overall
purpose of the bankruptcy system is to promote the economic independence of productive persons, rather than the economic dependence of the destitute,31 it follows that the scope of fresh start,
facilitated by discharge, should advance this goal.
3. Denial of Discharge
Emphasis on the interrelationship between discharge and fresh
start policy can be misleading. Despite popular belief and catachresis, debt discharge is not a right.32 Discharge may be denied to pun-

ish those debtors engaging in conduct repugnant to the Bankruptcy
tomarily associated with this proposition is Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,

244 (1934). Local Loan Co., however, relied upon Williams v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) which in turn relied upon Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
26. The paternalistic aspect is illustrated in a number of ways, the least of which
is that discharge is granted regardless of the cause of the debtor's financial misfortune. The shameless as well as unfortunate are entitled to discharge. Furthermore,
discharge is nonwaivable right, and contracts that impair the right to file bankruptcy
are unenforceable. Ayer, supra note 13, at 368-69.
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Howard, infra note 29, at
1050.
28. See Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1398 (1985). Professor Jackson notes that the fresh start policy is largely limited to
the protection of human capital as it manifests itself in earings. Id.
29. See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 228 (1986). See
also Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047
(1987).
30. Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 111 (Autumn 1977).
31. See Howard, supra note 29, at 1079.
32. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) ("There is no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts in bankruptcy."); In re Tabibian, 289
F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1961) ("It is true that a discharge is a privilege granted the
honest debtor and not a right accorded all bankrupts.").
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Code.33 The punitive character of this sanction is obvious. When
discharge is denied all obligations owed to creditors remain intact
and enforceable against the debtor at the close of the bankruptcy
case. 3 4 This also serves to deter certain wrongful conduct. Furthermore, denying discharge to debtors guilty of certain transgressions
comports with the insistence of courts and commentators alike that
only "honest but unfortunate" debtors receive the benefit of
discharge.35
When an objection to discharge36 is raised, it presents what is
thought to be "one of the gravest possible issues" in a bankruptcy
case.3 7 The objecting party or creditor must marshall compelling evidence of the debtor's violative conduct to support the denial.3 8 The
type of conduct warranting denial of discharge has been described as
the "broad, deliberate failure on the debtor's part to act fairly, equitably, and responsibly in the conduct of debtor-creditor relations. .

..

"39

In the proscribed conduct warranting a denial of

discharge, a common denominator can be seen. Each activity involves fraud or similar wrongdoing by the debtor aimed at foiling
creditor collection efforts.40 Where the debtor has transferred assets
on the eve of bankruptcy, the denial of discharge, as opposed to the
recapture of assets, is considered an appropriate response, since all
creditors suffer injury.4l Denial of discharge is not, however, the
only avenue of attacking bankruptcy estate planning.42
33. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)-(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (specifying certain wrongful conduct that justfies denying a debtor a discharge).
34. Austin Farm Center v. Harrison (In re Harrison), 71 Bankr. 457, 459 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1987).
35. Jackson, supra note 28, at 1440.
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
37. See Peoples State Bank v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 Bankr. 697, 701
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. A debtor may be denied discharge for making a false oath, using or presenting a false claim, withholding property from the estate, transferring property from
the estate, failing to account for loss of assets, failing to obey an order of the bankruptcy court, concealing or destroying property. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
41. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 1446. This is to be compared with debts excepted from discharge under section 523. Under that section, a debtor will be denied
discharge of a particular debt for the willful and malicious injury to another. The
general difference between section 523 and section 727 has to do with the extent of
the harm the activities cause. Injury occasioned by violation of section 727 is not
directed toward a particular creditor as in the case of section 523. Jackson, supra note
28, at 1446 n.167.
42. A creditor or trustee challenging a conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property may do so under a number of legal theories. The conversion and
claimed exemption may be challenged as fraudulent transfer under state or federal
law. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). It also may be chal-
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Exemptions in Bankruptcy

The Development of Exemptions in Bankrupcty

Exemption provisions protect and provide for the debtor's fundamental human needs by limiting the assets available for distribution
to creditors.43 Although exemption provisions have been part of
American bankruptcy law from its inception,44 the common law had
no regard for the plight of debtors or their families.45 Existing exemptions were based upon the purely practical consideration of what
was needed to earn a living to repay debts.46 While the factors influencing individual state exemption law are varied, this austere trend
was embraced in the northeastern United States. 4 7
The early federal bankruptcy laws contained their own exemptions
independent of state exemption laws.4 8 As the economic fluctuations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries demonstrated,
anyone could suffer from the economic uncertainties of modern society. 4 9 Consequently, more generous exemption rights were ap-

proved to protect the populace from poverty. 50 In 1867, a uniform
lenged as being outside the scope of allowable exemptions. See First Bank of Catoosa
v. Reid (In re Reid), 757 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir. 1985) (paintings received in exchange for debt forgiveness "were not held primarily for personal, family, or household use" as required by exemption statute). See generally Hardin, Conversion of
Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy in Arkansas, 10 U. ARK.
LrrrLE RoCK L.J. 719 (1987-88).
43. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
44. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, the necessary wearing apparel and bedding of the bankrupt and his or her spouse and children were exempt. Bankruptcy
Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (1800). A percentage of the bankrupt's estate
not to exceed $800 was also exempt. Id. at §§ 34-35, 2 Stat. 19, 30-31 (1800).
45. Although creditors were prohibited from seizing property that would strip
the debtor of the only means of earning money to repay the debt, not until 1845 did
England adopt a statute "to protect the actual necessaries of debtors" being seized
on execution. Small Debts Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 127, § 8. This exemption applied only to wearing apparel, bedding, and implements of trade, the whole not to
exceed £5. Rombauer, Debtors' Exemption Statutes-Revision Ideas, 36 WASH. L. REV.
484, 485 n.8 (1961).
46. Rombauer, supra note 45, at 485. "As against ordinary distress for rent, there
was an exemption of tools, utensils, and animals by which a debtor earned his living."
Id. (citing Hutchins v. Chambers, 1 Burrows 588, 97 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1758)).
47. See Resnick, Prudent Planningor Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets
to Purchaseor Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615,
620 n.20 (1978) ("Exemption laws in northeastern states ... [have reflected] traditional pro-commerce attitudes, as well as early puritanical attitudes toward thrift and
economic responsibility.").
48. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 34, 35, 2 Stat. 19, 23, 30-31 (1800);
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (1841).
49. More liberal exemption laws were passed to ameliorate the mass impoverishment following the Civil War. Resnick, supra note 47, at 620-21 n.23.
50. See Vukowich, Debtor's Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 783 (1974); See Resnick, supra note 47, at 620. See also Poznanovic v. Maki, 209 Minn. 379, 382, 296 N.W.
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federal exemption was established giving debtors a choice between
state and federal exemptions.51 However, this choice was eliminated
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 which simply incorporated the exemptions of the debtor's home state.5 2
Under current bankruptcy law, all of the debtor's property automatically becomes the property of the bankruptcy estate upon filing
for relief.53 However, the debtor is allowed to claim certain property
as exempt, thereby removing it from the bankruptcy estate and the
reach of creditors.54 Under section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code,
federal bankruptcy law incorporates state law by allowing debtors, in
some cases, to choose between exemptions available under state law
or those offered in the Bankruptcy Code.55 Although uniform federal exemptions were recommended,56 Congress enacted federal exemptions yet allowed states the power to limit residents to the
exemptions available under state law.57

This compromise was

designed to minimize the potential conflict between the federal and
state exemptions.
Unless a state exercises its right to opt out,5 8 federal exemptions

provide both a maximum dollar limitation as well as a minimum exemption level to protect those debtors in states with less generous
exemption statutes. 5 9 For the most part, property exempted under
state law encompasses those things necessary for sustenance. Wearing apparel, cooking utensils, and bedding are common
exemptions.60
415, 417 (1941). In Poznanovic the Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed these principles by stating, "The humane and enlightened purpose of an exemption is to protect
a debtor and his family against absolute want by allowing them out of his property
some reasonable means of support and education and the maintenance of the decen-

cies and proprieties of life." Id.
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 517, 522-23 (1867).
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548 (1898).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (containing language allowing
states to opt-out of the federal exemption and limit residents to the exemptions available under that state's exemption laws).
56. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS IN THE UNITED

STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 170-71 (1973).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
58. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (MB) 522.02 n.4a (15th ed. 1989). Thirty-six
states have enacted legislation opting-out of the federal exemptions and limiting
debtor's to exemptions available under state law. Id.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) & (d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See Resnick, supra note
47, at 620.
60. See MINN. STAT. § 550.37, subd. 4 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02 (1974
& Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-45-2 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
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The Exemption Policy

By allowing the retention of exempt property for use in the
postbankruptcy period,61 exemption laws work in tandem with debt
discharge in promoting the debtor's fresh start. 62 In doing this, both
state and federal exemption laws serve three related purposes essential to the fresh start policy: protecting the debtor from impoverishment during periods of financial stress, enhancing the debtor's
prospects of future economic independence through rehabilitation,
and placing the burden of credit-related social welfare problems on
the creditor rather than society. 6 3 Exemptions provide the resources
with which the debtor can rehabilitate himself. If exemptions were
not granted, the responsibility of supporting debtors through welfare payments would rest on society.64 A debtor seeking to shelter
wealth through bankruptcy by converting it into exempt assets does
not advance these purposes. 6 5 Exemptions were neither created nor
intended to benefit the dishonest debtor in perpetrating a fraud
upon creditors. 66
From an economic standpoint, allowing the debtor to choose
which property to claim as an exemption promotes the basic fresh
start philosophy in a number of ways. 6 7 By exempting property, the
dual hardship that the debtor never anticipated the loss of the property and that the property which otherwise would be surrendered is
more valuable to the debtor than to his creditors is alleviated.68
These hardships are minimized because allowing the debtor to select
the assets which will
be exempt protects the debtor from excessive
69
"asset-loss" costs.

Additionally, exemptions mitigate the effect of

externalities7O caused by the debtor's "mortgaging" the future value
61.

Section 522 Exemptions: A Look at the IndividualDebtor's Reduction of the Bankruptcy

Estate, 5 BANKR. DEv. J. 131, 131 (1987) [hereinafter Reduction].

62. Howard, supra note 29, at 1077.
63. COMMENT, Bankruptcy Exemptions: State Law or Federal Policy?, 35 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 630, 632 (1974) [hereinafter Federal Policy]. Professor Resnick adds the policies
of protecting the dignity and religious identity of the debtor and protecting the
debtor's family to the list of policies advanced by exemptions. Resnick, supra note 47,
at 621.
64. Resnick, supra note 47, at 626.
65. Jackson, supra note 28, at 1434.
66. Resnick, supra note 47, at 629.
67. Jackson, supra note 28, at 1439.
68. If a debtor were forced to surrender such property, the debtor would bear
the cost of the difference between the present depreciated market value of the personal property and the value of his future consumption which is in excess of the
property's present depreciated value. Id. at 1444.
69. Id. at 1427. "Asset-loss" cost is the additional cost in non-cash terms that the
debtor bears when the asset is worth more to the individual debtor than it is to the
creditors. Id.
70. Simply put, in the context of bankruptcy an externality is the cost borne by a
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of property for present consumption.71 In choosing exemptions of
the highest future value, a debtor decreases the probability of having
to invest a greater amount of future earnings to repurchase that
property, or passing the reacquisition cost to society.72 Most importantly, the exemption of wage substitutes,7 3 such as IRA's or whole
life insurance contracts, preserves and supplements the debtor's future earnings and decreases the probability that the debtor will gen74
erate externalities.
While exemptions promote valid public policies, they have often
been the target of criticism. Some state exemption statutes contain
anachronistic provisions virtually unchanged since their enactment. 7 5 What was undoubtedly a generous statute in the nineteenth

century stands as a quaint relic in economic times. 76 Similarly, some

third party as a result of the debtor's conduct which is disproportionate to the cost
borne by the debtor himself. Jackson, supra note 28, at 1418. An example of an
externality that inflicts high costs on the debtor's family and society in general is the
loss of the debtor's homestead. See, e.g., First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed),
700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
71. Jackson, supra note 28, at 1419.
72. Id. at 1439 (debtors often exempt durable goods and wage substitutes
thereby obtaining a fresh start without passing the cost of future consumption on to
society).
73. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 28, at 1434. Wage substitutes are defined as a
form of savings, held by the debtor for use at a later time in lieu of wages. Such wage
substitutes include annuitites or qualified pension plans. Id. The status of certain
wage substitutes as an allowable exemption remains an issue, at least in the Minnesota bankruptcy district. In In re Netz, No. 3-88-1888 (Bankr. D. Minn. filed Oct. 17,
1988), the Minnesota bankruptcy court declared unconstitutional Minnesota's employee benefits exemption set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 550.37, subd. 24
(1988).
74. Jackson, supra note 28, at 1434.
75. See Countryman, Consumer Bankruptcy-Some Recent Changes and Some Proposals,
19 U. KAN. L. REV. 165, 167 (1971); See also Joslin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for
Modernization, 34 IND. LJ. 355, 375 (1959) ("nearly every jurisdiction is long overdue
for a re-evaluation and analysis of its exemption laws.... It is evident that there is an
urgency for a modernization of exemption laws, an urgency singularly and forcefully
shown by even a casual observation of the archaic provisions and values still extant in
the laws of most jurisdictions.").
76. In South Dakota, a debtor may exempt the following:
two cows, five swine, two yoke of oxen, or one span of horses or mules,
twenty-five sheep and their lambs under six months old, and all wool of the
same, and all cloth and yarn manufactured therefrom, the necessary food for
the animals hereinbefore mentioned for one year, either provided or growing, or both, as the debtor may choose; also one wagon, one sleigh, two
plows, one harrow, and farming machinery and utensils, including tackle for
teams, not exceeding twelve hundred fifty dollars in value.
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-45-5 (1983). Under North Dakota law, a debtor may
exempt "[a]ll crops and grain, both threshed and unthreshed, raised by the debtor on
not to exceed one hundred sixty acres.., of land in one tract occupied by the debtor,
either as owner or tenant, as the debtor's home .. " N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-02
(1987). A debtor may also exempt "[tihe provisions for the debtor and the debtor's
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state exemptions are without dollar limitation.77
This economic and technological obsolescence coupled with the
open-endedness of some state exemptions enables a debtor to keep
property from creditors without serving a legitimate social policy objective.78 When this occurs, creditors are unduly hampered in the
collection of their claims.79 The case of In re FreedlanderOreveals the
inequity flowing from just such an exemption. In Freedlander, the
debtor sought to exempt, pursuant to state exemption law, 8 1 one
thoroughbred race horse valued between $50,000 and $640,000.82

The creditors argued that to permit the debtor to retain such a valuable piece of property under the guise of exemption would subvert
the spirit and purpose of the exemption.8S The bankruptcy court
responded that, since the exemption statute antedated the advent of
automobiles, the legislature probably only intended to allow debtors
to retain some means of transportation.84 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court declined to limit the exemption where the legislature
had not. 8 5 The bankruptcy court concluded that In re Maginnis8 6 supported the decision reached in Freedlander. In Maginnis, an exemption of $2,795 worth of china and silver was sustained pursuant to
family necessary for one year's supply, either provided or growing, or both, and fuel
necessary for one year." Id.
77. A prime example of an open-ended exemption is the homestead exemption
in Minnesota. Under Minnesota law, a house owned and occupied by a debtor as his
dwelling place, together with the land upon which it is situated, constitutes the
debtor's homestead and is exempt from seizure or sale under legal process. MINN.
STAT. § 510.01 (1986). Furthermore, the family bible, library, as well as a seat in any
house of worship and a burial lot are all exempted in an unlimited amount under
Minnesota law. MINN. STAT. § 550.37, subd. 2, 3 (1986). But see In re Hilary, 76

Bankr. 683 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (Kressel, J.) (holding that the unlimited exemption for musical instruments in MINN. STAT. § 550.37, subd. 2 is unconstitutional); In
re Bailey, 84 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (O'Brien, J.) (holding MINN. STAT.
§ 550.37, subd. 22 unconstitutional to the extent that those elements of a personal
injury action constituting claims for special damages are exempted without
limitation).
78. Resnick, supra note 47, at 628; FederalPolicy, supra note 63, at 632.
79. Resnick, supra note 47, at 628.
80. In re Freedlander, 93 Bankr. 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988).
81. "[E]very householder.., shall . ..be entitled to hold exempt from levy or
distress the following articles ...to be selected by him.. . (5) ... 1 horse .. " Id. at
450 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (1950)).

82. The horse was originally valued by the debtor at $650,000. However, the
debtor, whose hobby was horse racing, maintained that the horse's poor showing in
several races had considerably diminished the horse's value. Freedlander,93 Bankr. at
450.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. In 1876 the legislature removed a one hundred dollar limit on the value of an
exemptable horse. Id. 450 n.2.
86. In re Maginnis, 24 Bankr. 146 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
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the same statute which also allowed a debtor to exempt six plates,
twelve knives, twelve forks, two dozen spoon and twelve dishes.87
Conceding that the debtor in Freedlander was permitted more than
the fresh start envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy
court responded that, "if the law is in need of replacement or reform, such action must issue from the legislature."88
II.

CASE LAw ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY ESTATE PLANNING

The bankruptcy system endeavors to reestablish the economic independence of the debtor. Essentially, this is accomplished by relieving the debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and
by making an equitable distribution of the debtor's nonexempt property to creditors.8 9 Although not mutually exclusive, these two aspects of the bankruptcy process are in constant tension. Neither an
equitable distribution nor relief from indebtedness can be considered where the debtor has unlawfully depleted, through bankruptcy
estate planning, the pool of assets available for distribution. The
problem facing bankruptcy courts then is to avoid the unfair retention of assets by the debtor,90 while still advancing the fresh start
policies underlying the discharge and exemptions statutes.
A. The Per Se Rule
The law is rife with cases involving debtors converting nonexempt
property to exempt property in contemplation of bankruptcy.9' The
87. Freedlander, 93 Bankr. at 450.
88. Id. at 451.
89. Hardin, Bankruptcy Planning: Risks of Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt
Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 12 OKLA. Crry U.L. REV. 279, 280 (1987).
90. Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 994 (1981).

91. Understanding how debtors approach the day of filing bankruptcy is important to understanding when bankruptcy estate planning becomes unlawful. All insolvent individuals approach the day of filing as essentially one of three characterized
types. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 101. Debtors can be classified as "natural" debtors,
"intuitive" debtors, and "counseled" debtors. Id.
The natural debtor, harassed by creditors, naive and uncounseled, does not attempt to alter his economic condition in contemplation of bankruptcy. Such planning may be impossible due to the debtor's poverty, or the planning may be
unnecessary in light of the fact that the debtor owns no property in excess of that
allowed by federal or state exemption law. The natural debtor receives no pre-bankruptcy counseling. As a result, the debtor files bankruptcy in a "truly natural condition." The natural debtor is the type most seen in consumer bankruptcy cases. Id.
The intuitive debtor is acutely aware of his deteriorating financial condition and
of the possibility of future bankruptcy. This debtor possesses actual or intuitive
knowledge as to the priority or nature of his debts and property. Accordingly, the
intuitive debtor transfers assets to certain favored creditors in order to optimize his
current and possible future positions. The intuitive debtor comes to his attorney
"structured for bankruptcy." The only issue that his attorney must resolve is how to
minimize potential harm to the debtor by timing the filing of his bankruptcy petition.
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accepted rule is that such conversions are not, per se, a fraud upon
creditors, even where the motivation is to place property beyond the
reach of creditors.92 The per se rule is supported by general legal
principles which require that an alleged fraud must be clearly shown
and cannot be presumed.93 A creditor challenging a debtor's bankruptcy estate planning must therefore show something more than
the mere fact of conversion in order to prevail.94
Justifications offered by debtors and courts suggest various reasons supporting the per se rule. One approach posits that the per se
rule is justified because the legislation conferring exemptions is absolute and without exception.9 5 This approach is consistent with the
general doctrine that exemption laws are to be liberally construed in
favor of the debtor.96 Furthermore, debtors are encouraged to make
full use of all available exemptions.97
A variation of this approach appears in First Nat ' Bank of Humboldt
v. Glass,98 where a pseudo assumption of risk theory is used. In Glass,
the court explained that credit was extended to the debtor notwithstanding the debtor's then existing exemption rights.99 Since crediId.; see e.g., First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb, 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying a
"hinder and delay" standard under § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code).
As the name suggests, the attorney assumes an active role in the counseled
debtor's bankruptcy estate planning. The attorney advises the debtor as to the priority of his creditors and the nature of his property-exempt or nonexempt. On advice
of counsel, the debtor takes the steps necessary to preserve relationships with certain
creditors or to engage in bankruptcy estate planning conversions or purchases of
assets in order to maximize his allowed exemptions. Id. It is the counseled debtor
who raises the scrutiny level of the bankruptcy court. See id. The counseled debtor is
the type of debtor to whom much of the following analysis will be devoted.
92. See Ford v. Poston (In re Ford), 773 F.2d 52, 54 (4th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v.
Lindberg (In re Lindberg), 735 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984); First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir.
1983); Bank of Pennsylvania v. Aldman (In re Adlman), 541 F.2d 999, 1004 (2d Cir.
1976); Grover v. Jackson (In reJackson), 472 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1973); Forsberg
v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926); First Nat'l Bank of Humboldt v. Glass, 79 F. 706, 707 (8th Cir. 1897).
93. Hardin, supra note 42, at 725. See Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1376-77
(8th Cir. 1983); see also City Nat'l Bank v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 646 F.2d 1220,
1222-23 (8th Cir. 1981).
94. Forsberg, 15 F.2d at 502. ("[B]efore the existence of such fraudulent purpose
can be properly found, there must appear in evidence some facts or circumstances
which are extrinsic to the mere facts of conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt
and which are indicative of such fraudulent purpose.") Accord, In re Adelman, 541
F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Ellingson, 63 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
95. Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 F. 73, 76-77 (8th Cir. 1915); Resnick, supra note
47, at 630.
96. Reduction, supra note 61, at 148.
97. Id.; In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d at 1090.
98. 79 F. 706 (8th Cir. 1897).
99. Id. at 707.
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tors are presumed to know as much about exemption law as debtors,
creditors necessarily assume the risk that debtors will obtain exempt
property when experiencing financial stress.' 0 0 However, this approach presumes that the purchase of exempt property is a considered risk of extending credit. At least one commentator has argued
that this may be a risk that creditors should not be required to
bear.10 In any event, if creditors are to be deemed to have assumed
this risk they are entitled to know what that risk entails.
Another approach notes that a debtor's conduct in converting
nonexempt property to exempt property affects no interest secured
by law for creditors.102 Rather, the debtor is held to be merely exercising common law rights of dominion over his property.1 0 3 In its
simplest terms, fraud cannot be predicated on an act permitted by
law.104 This premise appears in Forsberg v. Security State Bank,105
where the court held that a debtor's trade of nonexempt cattle for
exempt hogs was not a fraud upon creditors.106 The court noted
that while the transaction allowed the debtor to increase his exemptions, the debtor "should [not] be penalized for merely doing what
the law allows him to do."107 The court stated further that in order
to find a fraudulent purpose "there must appear in evidence some
facts or circumstances which are extrinsic to the mere facts of conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt and which are indicative of
such fraudulent purpose."08
100. Id.; Resnick, supra note 47, at 631.
101. Resnick, supra note 47, at 631.
102. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
A debtor in securing a homestead for himself and family, by purchasing a
house with non-exempt assets, or by moving into a house which he already
owns, takes nothing from his creditors which the law secure to them, or in
which they have any vested right. He merely puts his property into a shape
in which it will be the subject of a beneficial provision for himself, which the
law recognizes and allows. Even if he disposes of his property subject to
execution, for the very purpose of converting the proceeds into exempt
property, this will not constitute legal fraud. This he may do at any time
before the creditors acquire a lien upon the property. It is a right which the
law gives him, subject to which every one gives him credit, and fraud can
never be predicated on an act which the law permits.
Jacoby v. Parkland Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 229-30, 43 N.W. 52, 52 (1889).
WhileJacoby involved only a homestead exemption, its underlying principle has been
applied to cases involving non-homestead exemptions. See, e.g., Forsberg v. Security
State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1926) (applying South Dakota law); Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 F. 73, 76 (8th Cir. 1915) (applying Arkansas law).
103. Jacoby, 41 Minn. at 229-30, 43 N.W. at 52.
104. Id. at 230, 43 N.W. at 52.
105. 15 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1926).
106. Id. at 501.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 502. See also Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 874-75
(8th Cir. 1988) (citing with approval the rule from Forsberg).
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An oft-cited justification for the judicial countenance of these conversions is the House and Senate reports regarding exemption
rights. Based upon hearings on the matter, both House and Senate
reports state:
As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempt property into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy
petition. The practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and permits
the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is entitled under the law. 109
Debtors have, in some cases, argued that this congressional statement is a broad endorsement of the right to convert nonexempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy. lO The proposition
is, however, of doubtful validity. Not only does the statement overstate the judicial rule, IllI but the Bankruptcy Code does not even expressly deal with the question.11 2 Interestingly enough, several
members of Congress urged that eve of bankruptcy conversions of
nonexempt property to exempt property be disallowed in view of the
potential for abuse."l 3 This opposition was based on the belief that
creditors expect that a debtor's assets be available for distribution in
the event of a bankruptcy. However, the per se rule, as reflected in
the House and Senate reports, mitigates the unfairness and non-uniformity that would result from an outright interdiction of the practice of bankruptcy estate planning. This unfairness and nonuniformity would result from the diverse exemption statutes of the
individual states. While debtors in liberal exemption states may not
be unduly prejudiced by the prohibition of bankruptcy estate planning, debtors in limited exemption states would face the prospect of
having minimal exemptions.114 As such, it seems reasonable that
Congress intended to allow bankruptcy estate planning in order to
protect debtors in those states having minimal exemptions.115
109. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6317 (citation omitted); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787,
5862.
110. See Raymos v. Collins (In re Collins), 19 Bankr. 874, 876 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982); In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 683, 686 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
111. Hardin, supra note 42, at 724.
112. See Mickelson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 31 Bankr. 635, 637 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1982) (Committee Reports are often ambiguous and confusing, often contradictory and sometimes in total error when applied to the end legislative product).
113. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (MB)
522-41 n.21 (15th ed. 1986) [hereinafter
Collier on Bankruptcy] (citing Proposed Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1355 (1976) (Statement of Hon. Arnold K. Phelps)).
114. Id. at 522-42.
115. Id. at 522-42 n.24 (citing Proposed Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R.
CODE CONG.
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B.

Denial of Dischargefor Bankruptcy Estate Planning

While the per se rule recognizes a debtor's right to manipulate
property prior to bankruptcy, not every bankruptcy estate planning
transaction is proper.' 6 The prospect of having discharge denied
has become a caveat to all debtors' 17 that, notwithstanding the validity of an exemption obtained on the eve of bankruptcy, a grant of
discharge is not always assured.
1.

The Intent Clause

The granting of a discharge, unlike the validity of exemptions, is a
matter determined solely by federal law,18 pursuant to section 727
of the Bankruptcy Code. As the per se rule instructs that conversion
without more is not improper, section 727 answers in part the question left open by the per se rule. What more is needed? The partial
answer is intent; specifically, the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors. The unanswered part is what type of conduct constitutes
this intent?
The purpose behind section 727(a)(2)(A)t"9 is to punish debtors
who, with the proscribed intent, transfer property that would otherwise be property of the bankruptcy estate.' 20 A party objecting to
discharge carries the initial burden of proving four statutory elements: (1) that a transfer of property has occurred, made by the
31 andH.R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Committee on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1282 (1976) (Statement of Hon. Joe Lee)).
116. Hardin, supra note 42, at 728. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten,
848 F.2d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988) (debtor's attempt to shield almost his entire net
worth of $700,000 by 17 transfers within three months of filing bankruptcy justifies
denial of discharge); Devers v. Bank of Sheridan (In re Devers), 759 F.2d 751, (9th
Cir. 1985) (debtor's story that a tractor had just vanished was found incredible by the
court, and protection has not allowed); First Texas Say. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed),
700 F.2d 986, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1983) (debtor denied discharge when he rapidly converted nonexempt assets to extinguish one home mortgage and reduce another);
Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1939).
117. B. WEINZRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 1, at 4-36.
118. In re Reed, 700 F.2d, 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983).
119. Section 727(a)(2)(A) states in part:
Section 727. Discharge
(a) The court shall grant discharge, unless- .
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an
officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title,
has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has
permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or
concealed(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition;
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
120. Peoples State Bank v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 Bankr. 697, 705
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); Conti-Commodity Services v. Clausen (In re Clausen), 44
Bankr. 41, 44 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
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debtor or made at his direction or request; (2) that the transfer involved property of the debtor; (3) that the transfer was made within
one year preceding filing a bankruptcy petition; and (4) that the
debtor had, contemporaneously with the transfer, the actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or the trustee in bankruptcy.121
In most conversion cases where an objection to discharge is made,
the first three elements are satisfied with relative ease, due in part to
the broad definition of the term "transfer."122 Yet, notwithstanding
the statute's conjunctive language which contemplates alternative
grounds for denying discharge,123 proving the fourth element, the
debtor's actual intent, is a thorny task since it can rarely be established by direct evidence. 124 Consequently, an objecting party need
only adduce facts and circumstances, apart from the conversion into
exempt property, from which the debtor's intent may be inferred.125
After this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the debtor to
explain away inferences drawn from the offered proof.126 Once the

inference of fact of debtor's actual state of mind is drawn from the
circumstantial evidence, the bankruptcy court must determine, as a
matter of law, whether the debtor's state of mind equates with the
intent that the statute proscribes.127
121. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 80 Bankr. 953, 957 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987); Drenckhahn, 77 Bankr. at 704; Clausen, 44 Bankr. at 43.
122. The term "transfer" is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with
an interest in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986). See also S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5813; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 313-14 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6271.
123. Under § 727(a)(2)(A), discharge may be denied where the debtor has, within
one year before the date of filing the petition, transferred property with the intent to
hinder, or to delay, or to defraud creditors. See supra note 119 for the text of the
statute.
124. Wilder Health Care Center v. Elholm (In re Elholm), 80 Bankr. 964, 968
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten (In re Tveten), 70 Bankr.
529, 532 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Caspers v. Van Horne (In re Van Home), 823 F.2d
1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying same principle in dischargeability proceedings
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)).
125. See First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir.
1986); Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1582 (2d Cir. 1983); First
Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. Conti-Commodity Services v. Clausen (In re Clausen), 44 Bankr. 41, 45
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (debtor failed to rebut allegations that debtor's default in
Texas divorce proceedings, whereby former spouse obtained sole fee title to parties'
homestead satisfied § 727 (a)(2)(A)). See Shainman v. Shear's of Affton, Inc., 387
F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir. 1967); City Nat'l Bank v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 646 F.2d
1220, 1223 (8th Cir. 1981) (Act case).
127. In re Elholm, 80 Bankr. at 968.
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There is a split of opinion, however, as to the proper standard of
proof to be applied in objections to discharge under section 727. A
number of bankruptcy courts hold that an objection to discharge,
like many other issues in civil litigation, requires the objecting party
to only prove the debtor's intent by a preponderance of the evidence.12 8 In contrast, many other bankruptcy courts hold that the
severity of denying discharge warrants the application of the clear
and convincing standard of establishing the proof of conduct justifying a denial of discharge.129
2. Judicial Treatment of Bankruptcy Estate Planning
In applying the language of section 727, there is little agreement
among the bankruptcy courts as to what conduct constitutes the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud where a debtor has converted nonexempt property to exempt property. Naturally, the application of
any standard should not be mechanical,130 but the lack of judicial
agreement on the matter has prevented the acceptance of a specific
meaning of the intent clause of section 727. Without the guidance of
any clear standard, bankruptcy courts view the issue of discerning
the debtor's intent from differing angles. Some courts have focused
on the debtor's motivation in acquiring the exempt property.' 3 ' The
128. See Farmers Co-op. Ass'n v. Strunk, 671 F.2d 391, 395 (10th Cir. 1982) (an
objector must prove by a preponderance of evidence debtor's intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors); Gabrielli v. Shultz (In re Shultz), 28 Bankr. 395, 396 (Bankr.
App. 9th Cir. 1983) ("[t]he burden of proof on this issue is the same preponderance
of evidence standard that governs ordinary civil litigation"); In re Clausen, 44 Bankr.
at 45 ("creditor need only prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence").
129. See Booth v. Booth (In re Booth), 70 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987)
(the severity of an attack on dischargeability under section 727 warrants the application of the clear and convincing standard in establishing proof of nondischargeability); Fox v. Cohen (In re Cohen), 47 Bankr. 871, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1985) (this burden must be met with evidence that is clear and convincing); National
Bank v. Butler (In re Butler), 38 Bankr. 884, 888 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984) (the inference
of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud may be drawn from convincing evidence);
Secretary of Labor v. Hargis (In re Hargis), 44 Bankr. 225, 228 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1984) (a charge under section 727 must be sustained by persuasive and convincing
evidence). For an excellent discussion of the standard of proof required to deny
discharge under § 727, see New World Mktg. Corp. v. Garcia (In re Garcia), 88 Bankr.
695, 698-702 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
130. See Richardson v. Germania Bank, 263 F. 320 (2d Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 252
U.S. 582-83 (1920), wherein the court stated, "[t]he elements productive of that intent ....
can never be defined. They vary as do facts, and any judge or jury, dealing
with facts by some rule of thumb, will always miss the human touch. Testimony can
never be tested or weighed by machine." Id. at 325.
131. See e.g., Shanks v. Hardin, 101 F.2d 177 (6th Cir. 1939); Kangas v. Robie, 264
F. 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1920); Rameker v. Schwingle (In re Schwingle), 15 Bankr. 291,
294-95 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); In re Martin, 217 F. Supp. 937, 938 (D. Ore. 1963).
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case of In re Ford132 illustrates this approach. In Ford, the bankruptcy
court denied discharge, noting that "the primary motivation for the
[debtor's] conversion [from nonexempt to exempt property] was his
intention to remove the [property] from the creditor's reach. . . ."133
By negative implication, had the conversion been made with a different motivation, such as the desire to actually own the exempt property, discharge would have been granted. The motivation approach
is, at best, a semantic quagmire which has been criticized as inconclusive since many debtor's may have mixed motives.134
Other bankruptcy courts have relied on the policies behind exemptions to help determine whether the debtor's actions violate section 727. In the case of In re Zouhar,13 5 the debtor sought to shelter
nearly $130,000 by converting nonexempt assets into exempt annuities before filing bankruptcy.136 Distinguishing previous cases permitting such conduct as having involved smaller amounts, the
bankruptcy court stated, "While a bankrupt is entitled to adjust his
affairs so that some planning of one's exemptions under bankruptcy
is permitted, a wholesale sheltering of assets which otherwise would
go to creditors is not permissible."137 This decision seems justified
on the ground that the claimed exemptions were inconsistent with
the traditional exemption policy.138 According to the claimed exemptions approach, the denial of discharge is based not on the
debtor's conduct or inferred intent, but rather on the amount of
claimed exemptions. This approach diverts the bankruptcy court's
attention, for it implicitly requires that the bankruptcy court determine, on a case by case basis, the debtor's proper exemption level.
At least one federal circuit court has expressly renounced this
approach. 139
The approach used by many bankruptcy courts in inferring the
debtor's state of mind under section 727 has been the "badges of
fraud" analysis. 140 This analysis compares the debtor's conduct with
the analytical backdrop of the badges of fraud to infer the debtor's
132. 53 Bankr. 444 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984), aff'd sub. nom. Ford v. Poston, 773
F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 450.
134. Resnick, supra note 47, at 638-39.
135. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Zouhar (In re Zouhar), 10 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D.
N.M. 1981).
136. Id. at 156.
137. Id. at 157.
138. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
139. See Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (In re Smiley), 864 F.2d 562, 567
(7th Cir. 1989) ("we should not prohibit a debtor's full use of exemptions within the
limits of the law").
140. This analysis recognizes that cases decided under the comparable language
of section 548 utilize the badges of fraud to ascertain intent in fraudulent transfer
cases. Under section 548, the bankruptcy trustee may avoid transfers that were made
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intent in engaging in specified conduct. There are six badges of
fraud used to infer intent which are as follows: (1) the lack or inadequacy of consideration; (2) the family, friendship, or close associate
relationship between the parties; (3) the retention of possession,
benefit, or use of the property in question; (4) the financial condition
of the party sought to be charged both before and after the transaction in question; (5) the existence or cumulative effect of the pattern
or series of transactions or course of conduct after incurring of debt,
onset of financial difficulties, or pendency or threat of suits by creditors; and (6) the general chronology of the events and transactions
under inquiry.14, The debtor's actual intent is inferred by the bankruptcy court after specific weight is ascribed to conduct resembling a
given badge of fraud in light of all the evidence.142
The popularity of the badges of fraud analysis is perhaps explained by its versatility. The broad, expansive language of the
badges of fraud make the analysis applicable to almost any constellation of facts imaginable. This is particularly true where the debtor
has, with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, engaged in a covert
pattern of removing assets from the reach of creditors. Such a pattern was found in Fox v. Schmit.143
In Fox, not only did the debtor borrow money from a creditor,
never intending to repay the loan, but he promised to give the creditor the proceeds from the sale of the debtor's home if the creditor
would loan him money to purchase a new home. 144 After selling his
home, the debtor kept the proceeds. 145 Later, he liquidated various
nonexempt assets to reduce his homestead mortgage after the creditor obtained a judgment against him in state court. 14 6 Relying on
the badges of fraud analysis, the bankruptcy court found that the
debtor intended to defraud the judgment creditor.147 Furthermore,
the bankruptcy court added that the debtor's pattern of conduct was
designed to frustrate creditor collection efforts and was extrinsic evidence of his intent to hinder and delay creditors.14 8
within one year before the date of filing with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
141. See In re Clausen, 44 Bankr. at 44; see also In re May, 12 Bankr. 618, 627
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980). "The 'badges of fraud' that today serve as circumstantial
evidence of a debtor's actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors are the
same as those enumerated by the Star Chamber [in England] four centuries ago." See
Cook, Fraudulent TransferLiability Under the Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 263, 27071 (1980) (citing Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601)).
142. See, e.g., In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529, 534 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
143. Fox v. Schmit (In re Schmit), 71 Bankr. 587 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
144. Id. at 590.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 590-91.
148. Id.
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A similar pattern of conduct was held to evince an intent to defraud in First Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Reed.149 Shortly after arranging with
his creditors to be free from the payment of obligations until the
following year, the debtor quickly converted nonexempt assets to extinguish one home mortgage and reduce another prior to bankruptcy. 150 The debtor also diverted receipts from his business into a
bank account not disclosed to his creditors.151 In denying discharge,
the appeals court deftly expressed its feelings regarding the debtor's
conduct stating:
It would constitute a perversion of the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code to permit a debtor earning $180,000.00 a year to convert
every one of his major nonexempt assets into sheltered property
on the eve of bankruptcy with actual intent to defraud his creditors
and then emerge washed clean of future obligation
by carefully
52
concocted immersion in bankruptcy waters.'
An example of an obvious intent to hinder and delay creditors was
found in McCormick v. Security State Bank.153 After liquidating nonexempt assets and depositing the proceeds into his wife's bank account
and an out-of-state bank account, the debtor told his banker that he
was unable to make any payment on an unsecured note.' 54 The
funds were later used by the debtor to purchase a homestead.t55
The debtor's admitted lie to the bank officer and his concealing of
assets were cited as evidence of his intent to hinder and delay
creditors. 156

If, however, the badges of fraud analysis is to be the judicial litmus
test for ascertaining the proscribed intent it is not a marvel of precision. The case of Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings 157 is an illustration of this point. Although Hanson involves an objection to a
claimed exemption rather than an objection to discharge, the court
applies the per se rule and the badges of fraud analysis in the same
manner as in an objection to discharge case.
Kenneth and Lucille Hanson filed a joint Chapter 7 petition in
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of South Dakota, on November 30, 1983.158 The Hansons were farmers whose financial difficulties led them to default on their loans from First National Bank
149. 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
150. Id. at 988-89 (the debtor's nonexempt assets consisted of collections of guns,
gold coins, and antiques).
151. Id. at 989.
152. Id. at 992.
153. 822 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 807.
155. Id.

156. Id. at 808.
157. 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988).
158. Id. at 867.
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in Brookings (the "Bank").159 On advice of counsel, the Hansons
had much of their nonexempt property appraised and then sold it for
the appraised value.160 In a series of five transactions, the Hansons
sold a car, two vans, a motor home, and certain home furnishings to
their son and to Kenneth Hanson's brother for a total amount of
$34,415.161 A couple of weeks before filing their bankruptcy petition, the Hansons used most of these proceeds to purchase life insurance policies with cash surrender values of $19,955 and to prepay
$11,033 on their homestead mortgage.16 2 Under South Dakota law,
the homestead exemption is unlimited.163 The South Dakota exemption for life insurance policies is limited to $20,000.164
The Bank asserted that by transferring their property to family
members while retaining the use and enjoyment of the property the
Hansons committed a "classic badge of fraud."165 The Hansons explained that the vehicles were still stored on their property because
their son, the purchaser, still lived at home.166 The Hansons admitted that they occassionally used the vehicles, but only with the express permission of their son.16 7 The Hansons also admitted that
the household goods were stored in their home and explained that
this was because Mr. Hanson's brother could not retrieve the goods
immediately after the sale.1 68
The bankruptcy court denied the Bank's objection to the claimed
exemptions on the grounds that the Hansons' actions were
permissable under the law and did not constitute extrinsic evidence
of fraud. 169 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order,
concluding that it was not clearly erroneous.' 7 0 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals also affirmed. The court of appeals determined
that even though the Hansons retained use and possession of the
property after the sale, there was no evidence of fraudulent intent. 171
The court reasoned that a debtor is entitled to exempt certain
property from claims of his creditors under 11 U.S.C. section 522.172
The court stated, "When the debtor claims a state created exemp159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

163. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-45-3 (1983).
164. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 58-12-4 (1978).

165. Id. at 867.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 868.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 868-69.
Id. at 868.
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tion, the scope of the claim is determined by state law."t'" The
court also reasoned that the debtor's conversion of nonexempt property into exempt property "for the express purpose of placing that
property beyond the reach of creditors" without extrinsic evidence
of fraudulent intent, would not deprive the debtor of the exemption.'74 The court concluded that the bankruptcy court was not
clearly erroneous in finding that the debtors did not possess the requisite intent and that the debtors were entitled to claim their homes75
taed and insurance contracts as exempt.1

There is a common thread running through these cases in that
four of the six badges of fraud are invariably present where the
debtor engages in bankruptcy estate planning.' 76 This tilts the balance unfairly toward finding the proscribed intent warranting denial
of discharge in every bankruptcy estate planning case.
III. A COMPARISON OF TVETEN AND JOHNSON
A comparison of the factual and legal circumstances of Tveten and
Johnson reveals the troubling state currently faced by attorneys and
debtors. Although Tveten and Johmon arose in the same jurisdiction
and involved similar facts, the results reached were completely
opposite.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 869.
176. See Brief for Appellant at 10-15, Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d
871 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5312MN). Where bankruptcy estate planning has resulted in conversions of nonexempt property into exempt property, at least four of
the six badges of fraud will exist. Judicial interpretation and the broad nature of the
badges of fraud makes this inevitable.
Badge 3, retaining the possession, benefit, or use of the property, will exist since
this is a result of exemptions. Badge 4, financial condition before and after the transaction, examines whether the debtor was rendered insolvent because of the transaction. In a bankruptcy estate planning case, the debtor's net worth would remain the
same notwithstanding the depletion of the pool of assets available for distribution.
Badge 5, the effect of a course or pattern of conduct after the onset of financial difficulties, will always be present when a debtor moves to convert more than one item of
nonexempt property to exempt property. To rule otherwise differentiates between
debtors converting to exempt property within bankruptcy and those debtors doing
the same outside of bankruptcy. Badge 6, the general chronology of the transactions,
looks at the timing of the conversion to exempt property. When the conversion is on
the eve of bankruptcy, this badge will also always be present.
Badges 1 and 2 may also appear in bankruptcy estate planning cases, but those
badges examine transfers where the property is secretly being held by a third person.
Id.
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A.
1.

Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten
The Bankruptcy Court Decision

Omar Tveten was a physician who became involved as an investorprincipal in a corporation engaged in various commercial investment
activities.'77 Tveten personally guaranteed most of the corporation's major indebtedness.178 Tveten's financial troubles began in
1985 when several of his business investments failed, resulting in
79
substantial personal liability on promissory notes and guarantees. 1
After several lawsuits were brought to enforce these obligations,
Tveten consulted with an attorney. Three months before filing his
bankruptcy petition, as part of his bankruptcy estate planning,
Tveten liquidated nonexempt assets and invested the proceeds in annuities and life insurance contracts which were exempt under Minnesota law.180 After converting approximately $700,000 of nonexempt
property into exempt property, Tveten filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code seeking to discharge nearly
$19,000,000 in debts and guaranty obligations.181
After being notified of Tveten's bankruptcy, several creditors objected to discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 727(a)(2)(A).182
Emphasizing that Tveten was an unmarried physician with substan177. Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 872 (8th Cir. 1988).
178. Id.
179. See Brief for Appellant at 3-7, Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d
871 (8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5312MN).
180. Id. at 873. At the time, benefits payable from a fraternal benefit society were,
without a dollar limitation, exempt from creditor claims under Minnesota law. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 550.37, 64B.18 (1986).
181. The exact amount of debt and guaranty obligations was $18,920,000. In re
Tveten, 70 Bankr. at 530-31. In its findings of fact, the bankruptcy court found that
Tveten made seventeen transfers of nonexempt assets to exempt assets between September 28, 1985 andJanuary 7, 1986. Id. These included transfers of land and cattle
to relatives, the sale of property to a business partner, and the sale of securities. Id.
In his bankruptcy petition filed onJanuary 7, 1986, Tveten claimed as exempt, annuities and life insurance contracts valued at $531,538.54. Id.
182. In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. at 532. In a Chapter 11 case, confirmation of a plan
ordinarily constitutes discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1). Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(d)(3)(C), however, the confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if
the debtor would be denied a discharge under § 727(a) had the case been filed under
Chapter 7.
The objections to Tveten's claimed exemptions prompted the bankruptcy court
to certify four questions of law to the Minnesota Supreme Court regarding the validity of those exemptions under Minnesota law. See In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551
(Minn. 1987). One month after the bankruptcy court issued its decision denying discharge, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that while Minnesota law does exempt
the benefits paid by a fraternal benefit society, an exemption unlimited in amount
violates the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 557 (an exemption law without value limitation is unconstitutional where state constitution provides that a reasonable amount
of property shall be exempt).
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tial income and no dependents, the creditors argued that the "sheer
magnitude and timing of the conversions in light of Tveten's pursuit
by creditors, supplies the necessary extrinsic evidence that the
debtor's intent was to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors."183
Tveten admitted that the transfers were made to place the property
outside the reach of his creditors.' 8 4 Tveten argued, however, that
the specific acts of extrinsic fraud found in previous cases were not
present in his case.' 8 5 Pursuant to section 1141(d)(3), the bankruptcy court concluded that Tveten would have been denied discharge under section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if his case had
arisen under Chapter 7.186
Citing First Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Reed,187 and relying on the badges of

fraud analysis, the bankruptcy court concluded that the transfers of
land to relatives and associates, coupled with the rapid liquidation of
nonexempt assets while facing extensive personal liability, amounted
to "nothing more than an attempt to defraud creditors and an abuse
of the Bankruptcy Code."188 Distinguishing Forsbergv. Security State
Bank as a case where "the debtor converted property . . .to take
advantage of the reasonable exemptions,"1 8 9 the bankruptcy court

stressed that Tveten converted substantial amounts of property into
assets which he now claimed as exempt.190 Relying on Tveten's own
admission that property was transferred to place it out of creditor's
reach, the bankruptcy court found this to be, as in First Beverly Bank v.
Adeeb,191 an.admission of the intent to hinder and delay creditors.
183. Brief for Plaintiff at 6-7, In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987)
(Bky. No. 4-86-30, Adv. No. 4-86-71).

184. Tveten, 70 Bankr. at 530.
185. Brief for Defendant at 3-5, In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987) (Bky. No. 4-86-30, Adv. No. 4-86-71).
186. Tveten, 70 Bankr. at 535.
187. 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983).
188. Tveten, 70 Bankr. at 534.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1986). InAdeeb, the debtor acted
on advice of counsel in transferring real estate to some "trusted" friends. Id. at 1341.
After speaking with a second attorney, the debtor started reversing the transfers but
was forced into bankruptcy before he completed the reversal. Id. In finding an intent
to hinder or delay creditors, the appeals court stated, "When a debtor admits that he
acted with the intent penalized by section 727(a)(2)(A), there is no need for the court
to rely on circumstantial evidence or inferences in determining whether the debtor
had the requisite intent." In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1343, quoted in In re Tveten, 70
Bankr. at 534-35.
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2.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

After an unsuccessful appeal to the district court, 19 2 Tveten
sought review of the case by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to
determine whether there was extrinsic evidence demonstrating the
intent to defraud creditors.1 93 After distinguishing between the
debtor's right to claim exempt property and the debtor's right to discharge, the court of appeals reviewed prior cases involving bankruptcy estate planning.194 The court of appeals noted that, in those
cases where discharge was granted, by limiting the monetary value of
the exemptions, the claimed exemptions comported with the federal
fresh start policy.195 This policy, according to the court of appeals,
"has been explicit, or at least implicit, in these cases."' 19 6 Citing Forsberg v. Security State Bank 197 and In re Ellingston 198 as precedent, the

court of appeals reasoned that exemptions with a limited monetary
value accord with the federal fresh start policy.'99 By comparison,
the court implied that an unlimited state exemption does not comport with either social or fresh start policies. 200 The court of appeals
stated that, by converting over $700,000 worth of nonexempt property into exempt property, "Tveten did not want a mere fresh start,
201
he wanted a head start."
Holding that the bankruptcy court's finding of fraudulent intent
was not clearly erroneous, 20 2 the court of appeals agreed with the
bankruptcy court's findings that Tveten's entire pattern of conduct
demonstrated fraudulent intent rather than astute bankruptcy estate
planning. 203 In closing, the court of appeals distinguished the result
in Tveten from that reached the same day in Hanson v. FirstNat ' Bank

in Brookings,2 04 describing Hanson as a case falling "within the myriad
of cases which have permitted such a conversion on the eve of bank192. The bankruptcy court decision in In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. D. Minn
1987) was affirmed by the district court. In re Tveten, 82 Bankr. 95 (D. Minn. 1987).
193. Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1988).

194. Id. at 874-75.
195. Id. at 875.
196. Id.
197. 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926) ("the policy of [exemption) statutes is to
favor the debtors, at the expense of creditors, in the limited amounts allowed them").
198. 63 Bankr. 271, 277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (the bankruptcy court found
that the debtor's acquisition and improvement of exempt property consistent with
the social policies underlying exemptions); Resnick, supra note 47, at 621.
199. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876.
200. "In the instant case, however, the state exemption relied on by Tveten was
unlimited, with the potential for unlimited abuse." Id. at 876.
201. Id. (quoting In re Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154, 156 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
202. Id. at 876-77.
203. Id.
204. 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988).
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ruptcy." 2 0 5 This superficial treatment of Hanson provides the cataylst
for Judge Arnold's thoughtful dissent.206
3.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent in Tveten addressed two primary failings of the majority opinion. First, the dissent argued that there is no evidence of any
devious conduct by Tveten evincing a fraudulent intent. 20 7 The dissent pointed out that unlike the debtors in First Texas Say. Ass'n v.
Reed or McCormick v. Security State Bank, Tveten neither lied to nor
mislead his creditors, nor transferred property for less than fair
value.20 8 The dissent also noted that the majority opinion did not
cite to any such conduct by Tveten. 20 9
Secondly, the dissent revealed the underlying "separation of powers" issue raised by the majority opinion.2 10 "[W]hether exemptions
are limited in amount is a legislative question ordinarily to be decided by the people's elected representatives

....

[T]he problem is

simply not one susceptible of a judicial solution according to manageable objective standards."211 Expressing its deprecation, the dissent likened the majority's reasoning to the statement that "there is a
principle of too much; phrased colloquially, when a pig becomes a
hog it is slaughtered."212 This reasoning, argued the dissent, leaves
the distinction between permissible and impermissible claims of ex3
emption to each bankruptcy judge's own sense of proportion.2l
4.

An Analysis of the Reasoning in Tveten

Although the equities in Tveten favor the result reached and affirmed by the court of appeals, the legal analysis is questionable. Additionally, the court of appeals erronously concluded that Tveten's
205. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876.
206. Id. at 878-79. See also, Hanson, 848 F.2d at 870 (Arnold, J., concurring). In
his concurring opinion in Hanson, Judge Arnold remarks that the court's attempt to
reconcile Hanson with Tveten is flawed:
The result, in practice, appears to be this: a debtor will be allowed to convert property into exempt form, or not, depending on findings of fact made
in the court of first instance, the Bankruptcy Court, and these findings will
turn on whether the Bankruptcy Court regards the amount of money involved as too much. With all deference, that is not a rule of law. It is simply
a license to make distinctions among debtors based on subjective considerations that will vary more widely than the length of the chancellor's foot.
Id. at 870-71.
207. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 878 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 878.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 878-79.
212. Id. at 879 (citing In re Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154, 157 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981)).
213. Id.
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creditors would have little to divide if discharge were granted after
the conversion of assets. 2 14 Moreover, both the bankruptcy court
and the court of appeals avoided careful examination of the underlying issue. Though it is generally agreed that the conversion of nonexempt property into exempt property to place it out of creditors'
reach is not, without more, unlawful,215 there is little agreement
among the courts as to what more is needed to prove the existence of
the proscribed intent. The disparate judicial treatment of this issue
has reduced the bankruptcy court's inquiry to an ad hoc "I know it
when I see it" standard for finding the proscribed intent. This disparate treatment is evident in the Tveten decisions which, in effect, offer
differing reasons sustaining the same result.
Faced with a debtor who did not fit the traditional "honest but
unfortunate" mold, who took full advantage of generous state exemption statutes, and who possessed significant future earning potential, both the bankruptcy court and court of appeals implied fraud
in law where it did not exist in fact. Obviously troubled by the
amount of exempt property acquired, the court of appeals supports
its decision by properly noting that the "exemption relied on by
Tveten was unlimited, with the potential for unlimited abuse."216
Although this is undeniable, it was not by Tveten's hand that this
unlimited exemption became law. Moreover, the dollar amount of
the exemption was not the issue presented for review. By addressing
the dollar amount of the exemption, the court of appeals defines the
debtor's fresh start in terms of the amount of allowable exemptions.
Under such a definition, the freshest fresh start that any debtor could
hope to obtain would be by claiming exemptions to the fullest extent
under existing law. This is exactly what Tveten did. To deny discharge is to say that Tveten and his attorney should have known that
the Minnesota Legislature was wrong to have passed an unlimited
exemption. While the potential for abuse may be present, punishing
instances of debtor overreaching does not solve the problem
presented by the unlimited exemption.
Furthermore, while the court of appeals suggests that Tveten's
claimed exemption did not further any cognizable social policy, 2 17
there is no discussion or analysis of how or why Tveten's conduct
went "well beyond the purpose for which exemptions are permit214. Id. at 876. In his original bankruptcy petitions and schedules, Omar Tveten
listed debts of $17,528,893.00 and property of $1,913,241.99 of which $776,058.54
was claimed as exempt. This would leave $1,137,183.49 for distribution to creditors.
See In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
215. See cases cited supra note 92.
216. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 876.
217. The court stated, "His attempt to shield property worth approximately
$700,000 goes well beyond the purpose for which exemptions are permitted." Id.
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ted."218 The lack of discussion on this point presupposes that informed debtors know the limits to which exemptions can be
stretched. Less informed debtors, still believing that they are following the law, will continue to be mislead by unlimited exemptions.
In contrast to the appellate holding, the bankruptcy court not only
found fraudulent intent, but equated the debtor's admitted purpose
in acquiring exempt property with the pernicious intent to hinder
and delay creditors. Despite settled case law holding that a fraud
cannot be predicated upon an act permitted by law, 2 19 the bank-

ruptcy court inexplicably concluded that a finding of intent to hinder
and delay may be predicated upon an act permitted by law. This conclusion was also not discussed by the court of appeals.
To find the intent to hinder and delay creditors, the bankruptcy
court specifically relied on Tveten's admission that the purchases of
exempt property were intended to place property outside the reach
of creditors.220 However, this reliance is misplaced and ignores the
resulting and beneficial effects of any purchase of exempt property. 2 2 1 These are different sides of the same coin.
The resulting effect of purchasing exempt property is that the
debtor keeps the property notwithstanding financial uncertainties.
This resulting effect preserves the debtor's ownership of the property. In contrast, the beneficial effect of purchasing exempt property
is that the property cannot be used to satisfy a creditor's claim: it is
removed from the creditor's reach. Notice, however, that both of
these effects occur regardless of the debtor's intent in acquiring the
exempt property. A debtor stating that a purchase of exempt property was intended to place property beyond a creditor's reach admits
to nothing but the obvious result and corresponding benefit attributed by law to any such acquisition.
By relying on Tveten's statement, the bankruptcy court's reasoning suggests that the transfer was improper since only the beneficial
effects of exemption were sought. In other words, it was wrong for
Tveten to desire the obvious and implicit benefit of purchasing exempt property. This reasoning is reminiscent of the motivation approach applied to determine whether an asset conversion was
218. Id.
219. Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir. 1926).
220. In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. at 535. "Like the debtor in Adeeb, Tveten admits to
transferring the property to place it out of the reach of creditors. I find that Tveten
acted with the requisite intent to hinder and delay his creditors." Id.
221. As the court in Reed points out: "While pre-bankruptcy conversion of nonexempt into exempt assets is frequently motivated by the intent to put those assets beyond the
reach of creditors, which is, after all, thefunction of an exemption, evidence of actual intent to
defraud creditors is required to support a finding sufficient to deny discharge." First
Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added).
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intended to defraud creditors. 222 Whatever Tveten's motivations, it
is disingenuous to predicate the finding of actual intent to hinder
and delay upon the debtor's statement of an obvious function of an
exemption. A rule which denies discharge where a debtor's motive is
to shield assets rewards debtors for ignorance of the law and penalizes knowledgeable debtors taking advantage of their full rights
22 3
under the law.

The soundness of the bankruptcy court and court of appeals decisions is not enhanced by the fact that the exemption statute was
found unconstitutional by the Minnesota Supreme Court. While
agreeing that, under Minnesota law, a debtor may convert nonexempt property into exempt property before bankruptcy, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the exemptions claimed by Tveten
violated the Minnesota Constitution. 2 24 The exemption was unconstitutional in that it was not limited to a "reasonable amount" of
property, 2 25 and, insofar as it gave absolute exemption regardless of
value to annuity contracts and life insurance purchased from fraternal benefit association.226 This does not change matters in the bankruptcy context for it is possible to deny discharge just as readily with
a limited exemption as an unlimited one. Tveten's conduct would
have been perceived the same.
Its ballyhoo and saber rattling aside, Tveten was merely a Pyrrhic
victory for the objecting creditors in the case. While Tveten was ultiTveten remately granted discharge under Chapter 11,227 whether
2 28
ceived the sacrosanct fresh start is an open question.
222. As one commentator remarks about the motivational approach, "[a]n asset
conversion case should not turn on the skillful questioning of an attorney or the
artful answer of the debtor." Hardin, supra note 42, at 737.
223. Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (In re Smiley), 864 F.2d 562, 567 (7th
Cir. 1989).
224. In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551, 558 (Minn. 1987).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 560.
227. See In re Tveten, 97 Bankr. 541 (Banks. D. Minn. 1989) (confirming chapter
11 plan). Title 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) provides:
The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if(A) the plan provides for a liquidation of all or substantially all of the
property of the estate;
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the
plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under § 727(a) if the case
were a case under Chapter 7.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1982, Supp. IV 1986).
If all three conditions exist, the confirmation of a plan will not operate as a discharge. Although in its original decision the bankruptcy court concluded that Tveten
would have been denied a discharge if the case had been a chapter 7 case, Tveten was
ultimately granted discharge because the other two conditions of section 1143(d)(3)
did not exist. See id.
228. Omar A. Tveten, at the time of discharge, was a 60-year-old medical doctor
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Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson)
1.

The Bankruptcy Court Decision

Robert Johnson, like Omar Tveten, was a physician who became
involved as an investor-principal in a corporation engaged in various
commercial investment activities.229 Johnson, like Tveten, personally guaranteed most of the corporation's major indebtedness.230
After judgments were entered against him, Johnson, acting upon the
advice of counsel, sold nonexempt property and purchased exempt
property with the proceeds. 23 ' After filing for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7, Johnson's creditors objected to discharge on the ground
that the conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property was
done with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.232 Like
Tveten, Johnson admitted that his conduct was intended to place
who had been engaged as the sole practitioner of a medical clinic since 1958. Tveten
has liquidated all of his nonexempt property of value, except his clinic. As a consequence of his bankruptcy estate planning, Tveten no longer owns any investment or
income producing real estate or ventures except for his medical practice. His practice serves primarily individuals on public assistance and persons without medical
insurance. Tveten is not a medical specialist and, due to high malpractice insurance
costs, he may be forced to restrict his practice further.
Tveten's practice has also recently been subject to investigation by the Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners. Fines and restrictions have been imposed upon by
the Board of Medical Examiners. As a result, "it is anticipated that Dr. Tveten's income from the practice of medicine will not increase, and may decline, over the next
five years." See In re Omar A. Tveten, Bky. No. 4-86-30 (Bankr. D. Minn. Feb. 2,
1989) (debtor's disclosure statement).
229. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 80 Bankr. 953, 954 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 955-56. The bankruptcy court found Johnson made seven transfers of
nonexempt property to exempt property between June, 1985, and January 8, 1986.
Id. These transfers included: the liquidation of stocks and bank accounts to pay off
the first mortgage on his homestead; using proceeds from his interest in his medical
partnership to pay off a second mortgage and a marriage dissolution lien against his
homestead; selling interests in certain limited partnerships to purchase annuities of
$231,905.32, a whole life insurance policy of $4,000.00, and an IRA of $3,978.90;
trading antique furniture and other property for one baby grand piano; trading a
collection of wooden boats valued around $8,000 for a harpsicord of european manufacture; selling household furnishings, an automobile, a vintage wooden boat, and
his boat slip to his live-in girlfriend and depositing the proceeds into his annuity
account and/or IRA. Id.
232. Id. at 957. After electing the exemptions available under Minnesota law,
Johnson claimed as exempt his full equity interest in his homestead, his IRA account
and annuities, his pension and profit-sharing plans, and his musical instruments. Id.
at 956. The homestead was valued at $285,000. Id. at 955 n.3. The Chapter 7
Trustee and the creditors filed objections to the claimed exemptions. These objections were continued pending the certification to the Minnesota Supreme Court of
the issues ultimately decided in In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1988), regarding the constitutionality of the exemptions. Id. at 956; see supra note 7.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/6

32

Leary and Wallrich: The Night before Bankruptcy: The Eighth Circuit's Response to Ban

1989]

BANKRUPTCY ESTATE PLANNING

property beyond the reach of his creditors. 23 3
Noting that Johnson's state of mind did "not embody the deceptive animus that is the avatar of an intent to defraud," the bankruptcy
court concluded that the facts did not support a conclusion of actual
intent to defraud. 23 4 The bankruptcy court then undertook a
lengthy discussion to determine whether Johnson's express intent to
put his wealth beyond the reach of creditors constituted an intent to
hinder or delay creditors.235 The bankruptcy court remarked that
from a layman's perspective, one could say that Johnson's specific
intent was one to hinder, or at least delay, his creditors from seizing
property to apply to his debts.236 However, conduct constituting the
intent to hinder or delay in the bankruptcy context must be determined in light of the punitive function of the statute denying discharge. 23 7 As such, the bankruptcy court determined that denials of
discharge for pre-petition conduct should be limited to those cases
where the debtor's actions are truly blameworthy in an equitable
sense. 23 8 Finding that Johnson did nothing more than exercise a
prerogative that was fully his under the law, the bankruptcy court
held that Johnson's "bankruptcy estate planning" did not evince the
intent that merits the harshest sanction in bankruptcy.23 9 To rule
otherwise would frustrate statutory exemption rights by chilling their
full exercise.240
After an affirmation at the district court level,241 the case was sub-

sequently appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals where the
objecting creditors argued that the holding in Tveten mandated a reversal.2 42 In support of this argument, the creditors argued that
Tveten distinguished between policy-justified conversions and abusive conversions, 2 43 and that there was no meaningful difference between the conduct at issue in Johnson or in Tveten. 2 44 Interestingly,
Johnson also points to Tveten as controlling, but Johnson insists that
Tveten mandates an affirmation by the appellate court. 245
233. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 956.
234. Id. at 959.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 960.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 960-61.
240. Id. at 963.
241. Panuska v. Johnson, 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987), aft'd, (D. Minn.
June 16, 1987).
242. Brief for Appellant at 10, Panuska v. Johnson, (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 885296MN).
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id. at 9.
245. Brief for Appellee at 12, Panuska v. Johnson, (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 885296MN).
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An Analysis of the Reasoning in Johnson

Much of the Johnson opinion is a colloquy discussing which test
should be applied to cases involving bankruptcy estate planning
where the transfers can range from a few dollars to large amounts of
money. 24 6 Rejecting the badges of fraud test as lacking utility,247 the
bankruptcy court attempted to articulate a workable standard for application in bankruptcy estate planning cases. 24 8 However, the standard articulated and applied by the bankruptcy court in Johnson may
have overstepped the very language it seeks to interpret.
Troubled by the tension between bankruptcy estate planning and
proscriptions against such planning with the objectionable intent,
the bankruptcy court outlined three options for dealing with bankruptcy estate planning cases: denying discharge in all such cases; formulating a standard to deny discharge in some cases but not others;
or granting discharge unless an act of actual fraud or the presence of
a malign, directed intent to hinder or delay creditors is found.249
Johnson adopted the last approach.
While the conduct at issue was designed to put the debtor's wealth
beyond the reach of creditors, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the "[d]ebtor's actual state of mind does not embody the deceptive
animus that is the avatar of an intent to defraud."250 "Actual fraud,"
stated the court, "involves moral turpitude . . . it connotes deceit,
artifice, or trick which involves a direct and active operation of intellect which is designed to mislead."251 Under this standard, the
debtor is free to plan his exemptions in contemplation of bankruptcy
at the expense of creditor's expectations. All that is required is that
the exemption be lawful and the debtor not commit actual fraud or
possess a malign, directed intent to hinder or delay his creditors.
Deference is thus accorded to legislative determinations and judicial
interference is curtailed. This standard, however, does not necessarily follow from the statute. The language of section 727(a) does not
require a showing of actual fraud or malign, directed intent to hinder
or delay.252 Rather, a showing of an actual intent to defraud or to
hinder or delay is all that the statute requires.
Recognizing this flaw, other bankruptcy courts have rejected the
standard enunciated and applied in Johnson. In the case of In re
Oberst253 the holding in Johnson is criticized as negating the express,
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 961-63.
Id. at 963 n.14.
Id. at 959-63.
Id. at 962.
Id. at 959.
Id. (quoting In re Pommerer, 10 Bankr. 935, 939 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981)).
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
91 Bankr. 97 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
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statutory language.2 54 Conceding that it is difficult to define where
planning ends and hindering creditors begins, the bankruptcy court
in Oberst stated that "Congress has decided that the key is the intent
of the debtor .... This is an uncomfortable test and does not seem
equitable; but it is the law."255 The test as phrased in Oberst, how2 56
ever, also has problems of its own.

The decision inJohnson, like the Tveten decision, did not answer all
the questions raised by the case. In particular, it did not explicitly
answer whether the debtor's future income potential or the dollar
value of property converted constitute extrinsic evidence demonstrating intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. Where the legitimate
practice of bankruptcy estate planning is at issue,Johnson implies that
these facts should not control the outcome. 25 7 Likewise, Tveten also
appears to reject this notion, seeing these facts as part of the conversion itself.258
C. Tveten and Johnson in Retrospect
Although Tveten and Johnson are diametrically opposed, the two
cases can be reconciled based on the appellate standard of review.
Whether the debtor harbored the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors is a question for the finder of fact.259 Because the "clearly
254. Id. at 101. In Oberst, the debtor mortgaged her home thereby removing all of
its nonexempt equity. The debtor's former husband had obtained a judgment of
dissolution which required the debtor to pay $16,833.34. Prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the former husband was preparing to execute a writ of execution against the
home to collect on thejudgment. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor's conduct in mortgaging the home and spending the proceeds was done in contemplation
of bankruptcy and with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, namely her
former husband. Id. at 101.
255. Id.
256. The court in Oberst states: "If the debtor has a particular creditor or series of
creditors in mind and is trying to remove his assets from their reach, this would be
grounds to deny the discharge. If the debtor is merely looking to his future wellbeing, the discharge will be granted." Id. at 101. Yet, this test raises more doubts than
it resolves. Cannot a debtor, who is trying to remove assets from his creditor's reach,
also be merely looking to his future wellbeing?
257. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 963. The court stated:
The gut-level difficulty with the case at bar stems both from the massive
amounts of money involved and from Debtor's status as an affluent physician enjoying sound professional status, excellent current income, and unlimited future earning potential. The vast difference between Debtor's
present circumstances and the financial plight of most consumer and smallbusiness debtors in bankruptcy cannot be denied or ignored. Whether this
fact should control or even affect the outcome of an objection to discharge is
the question.
Id. at 961. The court ultimately concluded that it should not. See id. at 963.
258. Norwest Bank Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 875, 878 (8th Cir. 1988).
259. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 958.
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erroneous" standard of review applies to findings of fact 26 0 and be-

cause in both cases the bankruptcy courts' findings are not "clearly
erroneous," 2 6 ' the decisions are not inconsistent. Nevertheless, to
accurately gauge their value and impact the Tveten and Johnson decisions must be interpreted in light of the fresh start policy of bankruptcy law; any other analysis would prove myopic.
1. Reconciliation with the Fresh Start Policy
The inevitable confluence of discharge and exemption policies is
the fresh start policy. While discharge frees the debtor from the
weight of "oppressive indebtedness," exemptions allow the retention of property to facilitate rehabilitation and protect against impoverishment.26 2 By narrowly construing objections to both discharge
and exemptions, the debtor's future economic independence is encouraged. Yet, the value of discharge and exemptions to the individual debtor cannot be assessed strictly in terms of dollars and cents.
Discharge also embodies an ineffable emotional and psychological
liberation. For some, this freedom may be more valuable than the
dollar amount of discharged debts. Similarly, exemptions allow the
retention of property to which the debtor may hold strong emotional
ties. This is a significant social protection policy in itself.
Suffice it to say, however, that not all debtors are created equal.
While an overly generous exemption statute is of little use to debtors
with meager resources, debtors with abundant assets are able to reallocate their wealth to maximize exemptions. Fresh start then is by no
means a static concept. Some debtors, through no fault of their own,
will have a fresher start than others who are less fortunate. This is a
fact of life in a land of opportunity. If exemptions are truly necessary
to achieving a fresh start, as state legislatures, Congress, and the
courts have indicated, 263 then a debtor's full use of existing exemptions should be limited only to the extent that the full use exceeds
the achievement of a fresh start. Where exemptions contain fixed
dollar limitations, the extent by which fresh start can be attained
through exemptions is known and understood. Where exemptions
260. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 874.
261. Cf McCormick v. Security State Bank, 822 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1987);
Lovell v. Mixon, 719 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1983). As the cases illustrate, bankruptcyjudges are divided on this matter. The results of a discussion and straw vote
by Midwestern bankruptcy judges on the issue taken at the Nat'l Conference of Bankruptcy Judges in San Diego, October 2-5, 1988, were evenly split. Minnesota Law
Journal, Dec. 1988, at 19, col. 1.
262. See supra notes 21-75 and accompanying text.
263. The debtor's full use of existing exemptions has consistently been encouraged. See Smiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Belleville (In re Smiley), 864 F.2d 562, 567
(7th Cir. 1988) ("[Wle should not prohibit a debtor's full use of exemptions within
the limits of the law."); see also Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 961.
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contain no dollar limitation, the fresh start boundary is unclear, but
the debtor's right to a full use of exemptions is not. To invoke the
denial of discharge for a debtor's full use of exemptions undercuts
the fresh start policy by seeking to establish an unrealistic and idealistic equality among debtors. Since debtors entering bankruptcy do
not have equal amounts of indebtedness, why should they emerge
from bankruptcy with an equal amount of assets? Do not debtors
who maximize exemptions fall within the same fresh start concept as
debtors who do not maximize exemptions?
The counter argument, though not without some surface appeal, is
that it is unfair to permit high income debtors an exemption free-forall that only serves to shelter wealth through the bankruptcy process. 2 64 This argument hints that exemption provisions should apply
differently to wealthy debtors as compared to not-so-wealthy
debtors.
Exemption laws, created by legislatures and subject to the political
process, do not recognize class or economic distinctions. Should
such distinctions or equality be desired, they must have legislative,
not judicial, beginnings. 26 5 Penalizing bankruptcy estate planning
does not promote the achievement of fresh start goals where the
debtor's only misconduct is to take advantage of existing law.
There can be no doubt that the conduct in both Tveten andJohnson
was a conscious and avaricious effort to shelter wealth through then
existing state exemption laws. The wage substitute exemptions
claimed in Tveten and Johnson could be easily converted to present
value free from the hands of discharged creditors.266 Allowing debtors with strong future earning potential to emerge from bankruptcy
with a substantial amount of property intact does not and should not
appeal to one's sense of proportion or equity. That the actions and
results were entirely self-serving is of no consequence to the ultimate
issue presented, namely: Is the practice of bankruptcy estate planning, regardless of the debtor's future earning potential, the type of
conduct so odious to the fresh start concept that the denial of discharge is warranted? Probably not. Still this begs the question:
When do selfish motives become significant enough to require a denial of discharge? 2 67
264. Debtors seeking to shelter wealth through bankruptcy exemptions are not
advancing legitimate exemption goals. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 1444.
265. "This result, however, cannot be laid at the Debtor's feet; it must be laid at
the feet of the Minnesota state legislature." Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 963.
266. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 104.
267. In re Zouhar, 10 Bankr. 154, 157 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) ("While a bankrupt is
entitled to adjust his affairs so that some planning of one's exemptions under bankruptcy is permitted, a wholesale sheltering of assets which otherwise would go to
creditors is not permissible.").
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Despite all the questions surrounding bankruptcy estate planning,
it is clear that unlimited state exemptions, although a means, are not
the cause of abuse. Rather, abuse is caused by the framework of the
bankruptcy exemption statute and the standard used by the courts to
test the propriety of conversions to exempt property. It is apparent
from either an analytical or ordinary common-sense standpoint that,
when a debtor converts property from nonexempt to exempt form,
his basic intent is to make it difficult for his creditors to seize that
property. 268 The "intent to defraud" standard and badges of fraud
approach are cumbersome tools, poorly fashioned for application to
the delicate manipulations of bankruptcy estate planning.269 The
problem is exacerbated by the "hinder and delay" standard that denies discharge at the discretion of the bankruptcy court to even the
most deserving individuals for engaging in bankruptcy estate
planning.
2.

The Essence of the Problem

The cases of Tveten and Johnson can be analogized to the story of
Icarus and his father Daedalus, who escaped their imprisonment by
fashioning artificial wings made of feathers and wax. As the story
goes, Icarus, captivated by his own aerial proficiency, flew too near
the sun, which melted the wax in his wings and caused him to fall
into the sea and drown. As the outcomes in the cases demonstrate,
the debtor in Tveten, like Icarus, flew much too high for his fragile
wings and crashed. Yet, the debtors in Hanson andJohnson flew just
as high with the same delicate device, but avoided disaster by flying
in different places and on a cloudy days. The same conduct led to
different results solely because of the fortuity of judicial interpretation of the conduct, yet a case should not hinge on the debtor having
luckily filed in a favorable court.
In the Eighth Circuit, the bankruptcy courts wield unbridled equitable power in the weighing of these considerations where the debtor
has practiced bankruptcy estate planning. By wielding such broad
discretionary powers, the traditional inquiry under section 727(a)(2)
is transmuted into a procrustean exercise of trimming each case to fit
each court's own sense of equity and proportion. As Judge Arnold's
concurrence in Hanson and dissent in Tveten notes, basic differences
between the debtors that were, in his mind, "legally irrelevant"270
268. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 959.
269. See id. at 963
270. The differences by Judge Arnold are:
(1) Dr. Tveten is a physician and the Hansons are farmers;
(2) Dr. Tveten attempted to claim exempt status for about $700,000 worth
of property, while the Hansons are claiming it for about $31,000 worth of
property; and
(3) the Minnesota exemption statute whose shelter Dr. Tveten sought had
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are extremely relevant to the bankruptcy courts when exercising
their discretion and equitable powers in applying the per se rule and
the badges of fraud analysis to exemption allowances and denials of
2
discharge. 71
a. Human Capital
Unlike his bretheren, Judge Arnold recognized that the first difference between Omar Tveten and Hansons is that Tveten is a medical
doctor and the Hansons are farmers.272 Dr. Tveten was an individ-

ual who had invested a great deal of time and money in himself.
Tveten's investment in his own human capital resulted in a high
present income as well as a potential for high future earnings.273
The Hansons, on the other hand, were farmers whose prospects for
future earnings looked grim. The court recognized, at least impliedly, that based exclusively on potential future earnings, Tveten
stood a good chance of achieving a fresh start. The Hansons, possessing doubtful future earning potential, were in a poor position to
achieve a successful financial rehabilitation.
b. The Amount of the Claimed Exemption
With the exception of the Hansons' claimed homestead exemption, all of the debtors sought to exempt a form of wage substitute. 274

The problem with wage substitute exemptions is that

whereas the future value of the property is retained by the debtor
only on a transitory basis outside of bankruptcy, once the debtor is
discharged, the future value of the property is retained permanently. 2 75 The debtor is free to convert the future value of the property to its present value and the property cannot be reached by the
discharged creditors.276 The policy reason for allowing the debtor
no dollar limit, while the South Dakota statute exempting the proceeds of
the life-insurance policies, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-12-4 (1978), is
limited to $20,000.
Hanson, 848 F.2d at 870 (Arnold,J. concurring). But see supra note 163, and accompanying text (South Dakota homestead exemption is also unlimited).
271. Bankruptcy Judge Kishel's thoughtful opinion in Johnson effectively sums up
the problems involved in using fraud to measure bankruptcy estate planning abuses.
He states:
[T]he use of a "smell" test, while of some utility in the most extreme (presumably to be read "most odious") cases, would be so subject to the pitfalls
of subjectivity as to have no paradigmatic value at all. Everyone's nose, after
all, is different.
Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 961-62 n.9
272. Tveten, 848 F.2d at 873; Hanson, 848 F.2d at 867.
273. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 104.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 103.
276. Id.
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to retain these assets, to supplement the debtor's future earnings, is
fundamental to bankruptcy estate planning. 2 7 7 But where a debtor is
likely to achieve a successful fresh start on the basis of actual future
earnings, the reasons for allowing the debtor to exempt this form of
property become less compelling.
c. State Exemption Statutes
Because states have the power to force debtors to choose from
among several categories of exemptions, bankruptcy estate planning
will necessarily involve an intent to "hinder, delay, and defraud"
creditors, as currently defined, when a debtor attempts to protect
himself, his family, and his future earnings through bankrupcty estate planning. Moreover, state authority to control the exemptions
allowed in bankruptcy is likely to result in more categories of exemptions and dollar amounts that do not comport with the federal goal
of preserving property that is necessary for ordinary life. The original drafters of the Bankruptcy Code provided for federal exemptions
to assure that no debtor was left without property necessary for ordinary life.278 At the time of the Code's creation, Congress determined that state exemption statutes did not adequately fulfill this
goal.279 The federal exemptions generally include specific dollar
amounts rather than exemptions based solely on property type. This
type of exemption structure assures that bankruptcy estate planning
can be utilized only up to the amount of the conferred exemption.
The debtor does not have to convert property or transfer assets in
order to claim the property as exempt. The debtor only needs to
include the property claimed as exempt within the shield of the specific dollar amount allowed under the statute.28 0 Hence, it is not the
standard of fraud that has made bankruptcy estate planning a troublesome issue, but the opt-out compromise, as well as generous exemption statutes limited only by the elusive concept of
reasonableness, such as those previously available under Minnesota
law. 28 ' Still, the courts demand that the exemption tail wag the discharge dog.
As illustrated by Tveten, the standard under section 727(a)(2) has
evolved into an equitable balancing test examining two factors when
277.
278.
522.08
279.
280.
281.

See Jackson, supra note 28, at 1438.
11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (MB)
(15th ed. 1988); Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 995.
Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 995; see Nimmer, supra note 2, at 104.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 550.37 (1988). Arkansas, Iowa, North and South Da-

kota all have unlimited fraternal benefit exemption statutes similar to those relied
upon by debtors in Tveten andJohnson. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-74-119 (1987);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 512.17 (West 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-15-33 (Supp. 1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-37-68 (1978).
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reviewing the debtor's bankruptcy estate planning: (1) the future
earning potential of the debtor; and (2) the amount of property
claimed as exempt. Under this test, a debtor possessing potentially
high future earning who attempts to supplement future earnings by
claiming large property exemptions is suspect and considered a poor
candidate for discharge. This test strays from the express language
of the Bankruptcy Code toward a misplaced reliance on the bankruptcy court's traditional equitable powers. To this extent, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Tveten is directly contrary
to the United States Supreme Court's mandate in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Alers282 that "whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."283

The salutary effect of this standard under section 727(a)(2) is
questionable at best. The court of appeals balancing test is "subject
to the pitfalls of subjectivity."284 The distinction between lawful and
unlawful conversions will ultimately rest on whether the particular
bankruptcy court holds that ensuring a debtor's full use of exemptions is paramount to protecting creditor's rights, or vice versa.2 8 5
The weighing of these competing interests is a perennial debate in
the bankruptcy courts. While the debate rages on, debtors preparing
for bankruptcy cannot accurately determine the legality of any proposed purchase of exempt property. 28 6 They sit under the sword of
Damocles. The Tveten holding endorses a broad grant of discretionary, equitable powers to the bankruptcy courts of the Eighth Circuit
by abandoning a straight forward application of a controlling statute
in favor of a colloquial phrase better left to govern matters of animal
husbandry.287
282. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988).
283. Id. at 969.
284. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 961 n.9.
285. Reduction, supra note 61, at 148.
286. Id at 149.
287. See Id. at 961 n.9. In discussing this test Bankruptcy Court Judge Kishel
stated:
This test is popularly phrased via the fine, homely folk adage of "The pig
gets fattened, but the hog gets slaughtered." . . . (using the variant: "There
is a principal of too much; phrased colloquially, when a pig becomes a hog it
is slaughtered."). Use of this metaphor to structure a standard under section 727(a)(2)(A) would produce problems, but it would be at least marginally more defensible than the other colloquialism suggested by Plaintiff's
counsel [the "smell" test].... Animal husbandry at least furnishes weight
and age tests to divide "pigs" from "hogs." . .. Everyone's nose, after all, is
different.
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SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Bankruptcy law, like any law, encourages planned efforts to avoid
its mandates. 28 8 An immediate step that the courts should take is the
determination of the proper standard of proof for an objection to
discharge. Considering the severity represented by a denial of discharge, a standard higher than the civil "preponderance of the evidence" standard should be used.289 Beyond this, as Johnson points
out, judicial alternatives are limited.290 In contrast, legislative alternatives remain a possible and probably more effective solution.
Bankruptcy estate planning provides Congress an opportunity to
establish a definite federal rule permitting or proscribing such conduct. This could be done in a variety of ways. Bankruptcy estate
planning conversions are analogous to preferential transfers to creditors.291 These conversions, like preferential transfers, lessen the

overall pool of assets available to all creditors. 292 Accordingly, a rule
similar to the preference rule could be enacted by Congress which
would make voidable conversions to exempt property which occur
within a certain period before filing bankruptcy. Although it would
limit eve of bankruptcy conversions, this approach would have the
unsavory effect of conditioning the availability of an exemption for
certain property on the debtor's having owned it for a minimum period of time.293 Alternatively, the opt-out provisions contained in
section 522 could be repealed to limit debtors to the federal exemptions; exemptions which presumably advance social and fresh start
policies. This would make exemptions uniform, but it would undermine state prerogatives or ignore the needs that may be peculiar to
debtors within a certain state. Finally, exemption provisions of section 522 could be replaced entirely by a provision allowing the
288. Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 991.
289. See In re Oberst, 91 Bankr. 91, 100 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (discharge is to be
construed liberally in favor of the debtor requiring more than a mere preponderance
of the evidence to deny discharge); In re Booth, 70 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1987) ("the severity of an attack on dischargeability under section 727 warrants the
application of the clear and convincing standard in establishing proof of nondischargeability"); In re Cohen, 47 Bankr. 871, 874 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) ("the burden
must be met with evidence that is clear and convincing"); In re Hargis, 44 Bankr. 225,
228 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984) ("a charge under section 727 must be sustained by persuasive and convincing evidence"); In re Butler, 38 Bankr. 884, 888 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1984) ("the inference of actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud may be drawn from
convincing evidence").
290. Johnson, 80 Bankr. at 962.
291. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Under § 547(b) certain
transfers made by the debtor may be avoided by the trustee for the benefit of the
estate. See Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 993-95.
292. Eisenberg, supra note 90, at 994.
293. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 327, 341 (1982).
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debtor exempt property up to a set dollar limitation. The debtor
would be allowed to choose which property and in what amount he
wanted exempt. The obvious problem with this approach is that exemption choices will be influenced by factors apart from the social
and economic concerns that have been the traditional focus of exemption legislation.
As the number of bankruptcy filings increase, 294 so too will instances of bankruptcy estate planning. In response, courts have a
responsibility to apply existing law before creating new law. To the
extent that Tveten represents a broad grant of equitable power, the
precedential value should, in light of the express provisions of section 727 (a)(2)(A), be limited by the United States Supreme Court's
statement in Ahlers. The questions raised by Tveten, Hanson, andJohnson remain. Without a clear standard against which to evaluate the
bankruptcy estate planning, debtors and creditors alike must endure
the climate of uneasiness and confusion. The articulation and application of a coherent standard consistent with section 727(a)295 will
facilitate fresh start as well as exemption policies without sacrificing
one at the expense of the other.
Bryan J. Leary
Thomas G. Wallrich
294. Since the end of World War II, bankruptcy filings have risen at a staggering
rate. In the 39 years between 1948 and 1987, the number of bankruptcy filings increased from 18,510 to 561,278, an increase of over 2932%. See 1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COURTS at

31; 1983

OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OF-

FICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS at 12; 1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS at

132.

295. See supra note 271.
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